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Success of Shareholder 
Activism: the French Case
U nder the agency theory, shareholder activism is used as an alternative control mechanism to solve agency conﬂ icts between managers and 
shareholders. It can be deﬁ ned as a “range of actions 
taken by shareholders to inﬂ uence corporate governance 
and boards” (Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, 2009). 
As underlined in previous research, the various charac-
teristics of the activism process (motives for criticism, 
degree of inﬂ uential activities, sponsor identity) all have 
an impact on the outcome. To date, all research has dealt 
exclusively with the Anglo-Saxon context. 
Consequently, in this paper, we seek to extend shareholder 
activism literature to the French context, which proves to be 
of special interest in a continental European environment 
that markedly differs from the Anglo-Saxon systems in 
terms of ownership structure and legal framework.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the French economy 
consisted of a “ﬁ nancial network economy” governed by 
interlocking and controlling shareholders organized in 
cross-holdings (Morin, 2000). On average, the interlocking 
stakes held by these controlling coalitions exceeded 30% 
of the capital of French companies (Morin, 2000). This 
factor accounts for the fact that in French corporations, 
conﬂ icts of interests are not only between management 
and dissatisﬁ ed shareholders but often oppose two 
coalitions: a controlling coalition of blockholders and a 
coalition of minority shareholders. However, at the end of 
the 1990s, the French system underwent drastic changes, 
such as an increase in foreign ownership and a visible 
decline in the number of cross-shareholdings, although 
family ownership remained a dominant factor (Faccio 
and Lang, 2002). These changes in French ownership 
structure came about as a response to ﬁ nancial resource 
requirement, driving French ﬁ rms to adopt selective 
legal and institutional modiﬁ cations tending towards 
the shareholder model (Lee and Yoo, 2008). Notably, the 
New Economic Regulation Law which came into force in 
May 2001 acted as a watershed in the evolution of French 
shareholder activism. 
Before this date, the ﬁ rst step towards better shareholder 
protection had been taken in 1989 with the recognition 
of investor associations’ rights to claim collective dama-
ges for expropriated shareholders. However, French civil 
law still provided comparatively weak protection for 
shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanez and Shleifer, 
1998) until the New Economic Regulation Law came into 
effect in 2001. Prior to this, activist shareholders could 
not vote by mail and the 10% of voting rights needed to 
adopt a resolution prevented shareholders from putting 
forward proposals. Obtaining this higher threshold pre-
sented a major obstacle because of the concentration of 
ownership in French corporations. After 2001, the Law 
reduced this threshold to 5%, thereby facilitating the 
recourse to proxy battles. 
Our objective in this paper is to examine which charac-
teristics of the French activism process are signiﬁ cantly 
linked to its success. First, which sponsors play a “pivotal” 
role and what degree of inﬂ uential activity and motive 
are associated with success? Second, is the involvement 
of one of the numerous investor associations which 
emerged after the 1989 reform a signiﬁ cant factor of 
success? Third, has the 2001 New Economic Regulation 
Law, inasmuch as it has wrought profound changes in 
the characteristics of French shareholder activism, had 
a positive effect on successful outcomes? 
In this paper, we deﬁ ne the beginning of a confronta-
tional contest process as the ﬁ rst point at which minority 
shareholders voice their concerns in the French ﬁ nancial 
press. We analyse two samples of confrontational activist 
cases. Between January 1989 and December 2000, 155 
confrontational activist cases are recorded, and from 
January 2001 to June 2008, there are 88 cases. The term 
“successful” indicates that the activist coalition gains 
at least one of its objectives. We observe an overall ave-
rage success rate of 45%. We perform an empirical test 
using multivariate logit regressions. The main empiri-
cal ﬁ ndings are that: ﬁ rst, although there are currently 
more than twenty investor associations all specializing 
in judicial actions, they do not play a “pivotal” role in 
success. Secondly, it appears clearly that, in France, the 
nature of the inﬂ uential activity has a positive effect on 
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success over the whole period studied. We ﬁ nd that the 
more confrontational the activism process, typically 
resulting in a law suit, the greater the chance of the ﬁ rm 
acceding to the activist’s demands. Thirdly, consistent 
with recent literature, since 2001 the involvement of 
proxy professionals has become a signiﬁ cant factor of 
success, and institutional investors have begun to play 
an active role in France taking advantage of legal and 
institutional reforms. 
This paper proceeds as follows: in the ﬁ rst section we 
advance our theoretical model and propose our hypotheses. 
In the second part, we present the methodology and data 
sources while the third section we discuss the results.
 I. Theoretical background  ■
and hypotheses
Dissident shareholders may opt for a range of strategies 
(Hirschman, 1971). In some cases they may use an exit 
strategy by selling their stocks in the ﬁ rm. Alternatively, 
they may remain silent and vote with their feet, or become 
active and attempt to inﬂ uence managerial decisions by 
use of a voice strategy. In most cases, rational shareholders 
will become active if the expected beneﬁ ts of the inﬂ uential 
activities exceed their expected costs. For Smith (1996), 
“the expected beneﬁ ts of activism are equal to the pro-
bability of successful targeting times the shareholder’s 
private gain if successful”, whereas the expected costs 
are those incurred by a “pivotal” shareholder to break 
the free rider problem and thus to monitor (Bhattacha-
rya, 1997). These monitoring costs will increase as the 
degree of activism intensiﬁ es. As underlined by Wahal 
(1996), the degree which follows that of target selection 
linked to investment strategy consists of informal acti-
vities, in the form of numerous meetings and telephone 
calls with the management of the targeted corporation. 
However, if these private interventions should fail, active 
shareholders may move up to a more confrontational 
degree of activism, namely voting solicitation activities. 
This stage often involves media coverage either to solicit 
the vote of passive shareholders, or to threaten a proxy 
ﬁ ght. Thus the proxy battle at the AGM (Annual General 
Meeting) constitutes the penultimate stage before the 
most confrontational degree of activism, that of pursuing 
a judicial action. To be able to carry this activism process 
through all the various stages, the sponsor has to dispose 
not only of the ability to collect and process information 
and the skills to mobilize other shareholders, but also 
the ﬁ nancial resources to meet the costs. Moreover, the 
sponsor has to have a thorough knowledge of laws and 
regulations governing shareholder access at each stage, 
thereby proportionately increasing the costs borne by 
activist shareholders. 
As previously studied by Girard (2001), in the French 
civil law context only investor associations seem to be in 
a position to combine the necessary means, information 
and knowledge. Furthermore, French investor associations 
tend to have a much longer lifespan than their American 
counterparts (Gillan and Starks, 2007). 
Table 1: Specialized inﬂ uential activities by the most active investor associations in 
France
Name CEO(date of creation) Inﬂ uential activities Targeted corporations
France Petits Porteurs
(France Small Holders)
Charles Reguardati Lobbying activities Lobbies for the transposition of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Law.
SOS Petits Porteurs
(SOS Small Holders)
Jean Claude Delarue
(1987)
Media and judicial activities
Collect the accounts of 
retired customers badly 
advised by their bank.
La Poste (Bénéﬁ c affair);
Crédit Agricole; 
Caisse d’Epargne;
Eurotunnel, …
ADAM 
Association Des Actionnaires 
Minoritaires
(Minority Shareholder Association)
Colette Neuville
(1991)
Media coverage
Letters to AMF
Civil law suits 
Bernard Tapie Finance (1992); Compagnie du BTP 
(1993); Compagnie Générale des Eaux  (1998); 
Vivendi-Havas (1998); Schneider-Legrand (2001); 
Renault-Nissan (2002); Rhodia (2002, 2005, 2006); 
EADS (2006); Eiffage (2007) ; Atos Origin (2007)
APPACT
Association des Petits Porteurs 
Actifs
(Active Small Investors 
Association)
Didier Cornadeau
(2002)
Penal law suits Vivendi Universal (2002); Alsthom (2003); 
Marionnaud (2004); Rhodia (2006); EADS (2006); 
Eiffage (2007); Smoby (2008)
ASA
Association des Actionnaires Actifs
(Active Shareholder Association)
Me Frédérik Karel Canoy
(2005)
Class actions EADS (2006)
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As shown in Table 1, we observe that there are currently 
more than twenty investor associations in France, each 
specializing in speciﬁ c inﬂ uential activities1. 
  As Table 2 also shows, French shareholder activism dates 
from 1989 with the recognition of investor associations’ 
rights to claim damages for expropriated shareholders. 
This reform was designed to reinforce consumer rights by 
developing shareholder-friendly saving schemes, which give 
shareholders similar protection to that of consumers under 
the law. Investor associations provide general protection to 
investors holding equity in any company. To be legally enti-
tled to sue a targeted company, the association must have a 
written mandate from each of the claimant shareholders. In 
France, the law requires that when an activist shareholder 
is represented before the court, his or her own personal 
identity must appear in the procedure. This explains why 
an American-style class action is effectively ruled out by the 
French civil law system. At present, the closest approximation 
in France to a class action lawsuit is the “Representation 
Action” (action en représentation conjointe) enacted in 1992. 
This grants designated associations the right to ﬁ le a joint 
compensation claim on behalf of ﬁ nancially exposed inves-
tors, but requires that each claimant be named individually. 
These associations play an important role in the defence of 
shareholders, as otherwise weak protection would inevitably 
result in a free rider problem.
In France, Girard (2001) showed that the “pivotal” role 
has been taken up by investor associations, which have 
often been praised for their defence of shareholder inte-
rests. For example, by means of the minority assessment 
(expertise de minorité), investor associations can force the 
targeted corporation to divulge private information. It 
therefore seems appropriate to determine whether suc-
cess is positively related to the involvement of an investor 
association in the activism process. Therefore, we state 
this hypothesis as follows: 
HI: Over the whole period studied, the involvement 
of an investor association as an activist sponsor will be 
positively related to the probability of French successful 
activism.
During the 1990s, the best-known French investor asso-
ciation was ADAM (Minority Shareholder Association). 
Girard (2001) pointed out that this association interve-
ned in 32.4% of the 97 French companies targeted from 
1989 to 2000, with a success record of 59.38%. ADAM 
was able to attain this relatively high rate of positive 
outcomes by using legal loopholes, such as concerted 
action, to force individual shareholders to make a joint 
bid as a way of protecting the minority shareholders of 
controlled companies. Under French Law, one-third of 
voting rights are required to gain control. The notion of 
concerted action is deﬁ ned as “an agreement to acquire 
or to sell voting rights or to carry out a common policy 
towards the corporation though the exercise of voting 
rights”2. Nevertheless, it is extremely difﬁ cult to prove 
conclusively the existence of a case of concerted action 
between two blockholders. The second loophole used 
is linked to the evaluation of the exit premium during a 
squeeze-out. In France, the right to demand a squeeze-
out is comparatively recent. However, art.5-6-6 of the 
general regulation of the AMF speciﬁ es a multi-criteria 
evaluation of the exit bid, the loose deﬁ nition of which 
gives dissident shareholders and ADAM an opportu-
nity to negotiate a higher exit premium. This so-called 
“strategy of harassment” (Couret, 1996) was used to put 
a halt to proceedings or gain time in order to convince 
passive shareholders to become active, or to negotiate 
an agreement with the targeted corporation. The second 
advantage of law suits, such as the minority assessment, 
is to collect private information. If activism is used as an 
alternative control mechanism, the probability of obtai-
ning damages for expropriated shareholders should be 
Table 2: Evolution of the minority shareholder rights in France
Year Legal Reforms Fiduciary responsibilities
1989 Law n° 89-421 of
June 23, 1989
Recognition of investor associations’ rights to act and to claim collective damages for 
expropriated shareholders
Law of August 2, 1989 Emergence of the squeeze-out
1992 Law n° 92-60 of January 
18,1992
Consumer associations are permitted to sue in the name of at least two consumers who give 
them their prior written authorization
1994 Law n° 94-679 of August 
8, 1994
Recognition of the right to claim individual damages for expropriated shareholders who give 
a mandate to investor association 
2001 New Economic Regulation 
Law
Reduction in the threshold to 5% of voting rights 
Authorization to vote by mail
2003 Financial Security Law Shareholder(s) with 5 % of voting rights are allowed to put forward a resolution on the proxy 
statement sent 25 days before the AGM.
Investment management companies are required to draw up a report on the exercise of 
voting rights attached to the shares held by the collective pension schemes.
Merger between French Securities Market Regulators to create the Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers, an independent public authority charged with investor protection. 
2006 Decree n° 2006-1566 of 
December 11, 2006
Adoption of the record date which ends the blocking of shares before the AGM. Shares are 
registered three days before the AGM.
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positively related to the most confrontational degree of 
activism, which is constituted by the law suit. This leads 
to the following hypothesis:
H2: Over the whole period studied, a law suit action, 
inasmuch as it constitutes the most confrontational degree 
of activism, will be positively related to the probability of 
French successful activism.
However, recent legal reforms have largely encouraged 
proxy battles in France. The New Economic Regulation 
Law which came into force in May 2001 strengthened 
the rights of shareholders, hitherto poorly protected by 
French civil law.  
As shown in Table 3, shareholders prior to 2001 remai-
ned passive during Annual General Meetings as they were 
denied the possibility of voting by mail. They also had to 
buy or solicit more than 10% of voting rights to be able 
to put forward a proposal in the proxy statement and 
more than one-third of votes to contest a proposal put 
forward by the management at the AGM. With 10% of 
voting rights they could enforce compliance with disclo-
sure rules and demand a minority assessment. This type 
of assessment was useful not only as a way of reducing 
informational asymmetry in one or several operational 
decisions, but also as a delaying tactic to facilitate the 
mobilisation of shareholders. Moreover, to be able to 
vote, the shares of the activist shareholders were blocked 
for ﬁ ve days before the AGM. The cost of blocking their 
shares had a strongly dissuasive effect. In a well-known 
example in France, Albouy and Schatt (2004) calculate 
the cost incurred by a successful French proxy ﬁ ght as 
around 250 million euros. They give the example of two 
institutional investors holding respectively 5% and 10% 
who sought to take total control of Vivarte by massively 
buying up shares in the targeted company. By the AGM, 
their joint holding had increased to roughly a third of 
Vivarte shares.  
Since the adoption of the New Economic Regulation 
Law in 2001, the threshold of 10% of voting rights has 
been lowered to only 5%. This reduction makes it less 
expensive for activist shareholders to solicit voting rights 
in order to put forward a proposal, vote by mail and sub-
mit written questions to the AGM. Moreover, since the 
Financial Security Law of 2003, investment management 
companies are now required to report on the exercise of 
voting rights attached to shares held by collective pension 
schemes. Since these recent reforms, the France-based 
asset management association AFG5 has observed that 
roughly half of investment companies investigated now 
hold a voting policy and 13% of them have voted against 
managerial proposals at the AGM. These active institu-
tional investors voted against certain speciﬁ c proposals 
such as nomination of board members, capital increase 
without subscription rights, the repeal of anti-takeover 
amendments, and executive-level remunerations. Given all 
of the above, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
H3: After 2001, the involvement of an institutional 
investor as an activist sponsor will be positively related 
to the probability of French successful activism.
As previously stated, since the 2001 New Economic 
Regulation Law, the costs generated by voting solicita-
tion activities have decreased because of the reduction 
in the threshold to 5% of voting rights. Consequently, 
since 2001 new professionals have appeared in the form 
of “informadiaires” (Van der Burg and Prinz, 2006), 
such as Proxinvest, AFG and Deminor (acquired by Risk 
Metrics). These new actors offer proxy advising services 
consisting of voting recommendations and proxy soli-
citation services, which enhance the effectiveness of the 
activist coalition’s campaign. Institutional and individual 
investors are inﬂ uenced by their recommendations to vote 
in favour or against a proposal. According to Alexander, 
Chen, Seppi and Spatt (2006), their recommendations 
convey new information to the market, impact on stock 
price and on voting outcomes. Thus by reducing infor-
mation asymmetry, these proxy advisory ﬁ rms would 
seem to have a signiﬁ cant effect on voting outcomes. 
This yields the following hypothesis:
H4: After 2001, the involvement of a proxy voting advi-
sory ﬁ rm will be positively related to the probability of 
French successful activism.
Proposals, even those which are not recommended by a 
proxy advisory ﬁ rm, seem nevertheless to play an advisory 
role in that they convey information about a quality problem 
with the controlling coalition and help passive shareholders 
to evaluate the potential contribution of each coalition to the 
ﬁ rm. This is particularly the case when activist shareholders 
target poorly performing companies. Consequently, the 
nature of the motive can play a role in inﬂ uencing passive 
investors to become involved in the activism process. Thus, 
the probability of success is related to the motive of activism. 
This results in our ﬁ nal hypothesis:
H5: Over the whole period studied, the nature of the 
motive will be positively related to the probability of 
successful French shareholder activism.
Table 3: Comparative Company Law of General Meetings mechanics
Judicial constraints United States
3 United Kingdom4 France
Before 2001 Before 2001 Before 2001 2001-2006
Proxy by mail Yes Yes No Yes
Share Blocking/registration required no/no no/no yes/yes yes/yes
Minimum notice of AGM 28 days 15 days 15 days
Shareholder proposals 1% 5% 10% 5%
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II. Data and methodology ■
II.1. SAMPLE SELECTION
There is no speciﬁ c database of activist shareholders in 
France. Data were hand-collected from multiple data sources. 
The majority of the data were obtained from a review of the 
French ﬁ nancial press (La Tribune and Les Echos) from January 
1989 to December 2000 and from the Factiva database from 
January 2001 to June 2008 using the key words “activisme”, 
“activiste”, “actionnaires minoritaires” (minority shareholders) 
and “contestation” (contest). Our sample consists of all public 
announcements by an activist coalition threatening, planning 
or undertaking a proxy ﬁ ght or law suit. Thus, confrontatio-
nal activist events beginning with the ﬁ rst announcement 
in the French media of the activist’s inﬂ uential activity were 
examined. The ﬁ rst step of the procedure enabled us to 
identify the names of target ﬁ rms. 
We then turned to other sources to collect our variables. 
First, we obtained documents from the AMF. Second, for 
each targeted ﬁ rm in our sample, we searched the Factiva 
database for the characteristics of the activism process. 
Speciﬁ cally, we performed keyword searches to identify all 
new items mentioning “association d’investisseurs” (investor 
association), “ADAM”, “APPACT” or any other investor 
association’s name in conjunction with the name of the 
ﬁ rm. Third, we collected new items from the websites 
of proxy voting advisory ﬁ rms. As a result of this three-
step procedure, we were able to determine the degree of 
activism, the motive of activism, whether a proxy voting 
advisory ﬁ rm was involved, and the activism outcome. 
There are different ways of evaluating the effectiveness 
of shareholder activism. One potential measure would be 
the presence of abnormal stock returns around the date 
of the announcement of an activism process. However, 
this was not consistent with our objective of taking into 
account all corporations irrespective of their ownership 
structure. In this study, we do not refer to the date of the 
proxy mailing to determine the beginning of the activism 
process, as this information is not available in France. 
Hence, we focus primarily on the results of this process. 
Moreover, as we have seen French activism is generally 
a long process combining a range of distinct inﬂ uential 
activities (proxy battle; law suit) with multiple motives, 
and with the likelihood that only one of the motives is 
actually achieved. To take into account this diversity of 
inﬂ uential activities and motives, recent studies have 
measured success as being the overall achievement of the 
activist’s goals (Becht et al., 2009; Klein and Zur, 2009). 
We deﬁ ne success as the activist coalition having achieved 
one or more of its goals relating to a case of confronta-
tional activism. For example, the case of Compagnie de 
Navigation Mixte, which succeeded in obtaining dama-
ges for only one of several claims in a law suit action, is 
considered as a single successful confrontational case. 
To constitute our database, we therefore obtained the 
outcomes of all judgements pronounced from Bulletin Joly 
des sociétés and from the CDrom Juridique Lamy-arrêts de la 
Cour de cassation. In Atos Origin Corporation, two activist 
hedge funds succeeded in obtaining board representation 
after a failed attempt to dismantle the company by private 
intervention. Since both motives were presented in the 
same targeted corporation at the same time by the same 
activist sponsors, they are also treated in our empirical 
test as a single confrontational activist event. 
Though our sample might not be exhaustive of all 
potential confrontational activist events that occurred in 
the 1989-2008 time period, we are conﬁ dent it includes 
all major events because any events that do not feature 
in our sample must also have failed to attract the atten-
tion of the media. In all, our sample is composed of 203 
confrontational activist events in 179 French corporations. 
There are 151 targeted French corporations which have 
been targeted only once while 28 French corporations 
have been targeted more than once. Where motives were 
presented more than one year apart in the same targeted 
corporation, each is considered in our empirical test as 
a separate confrontational activist event. The sample 
reﬂ ects the fact that there are approximately the same 
number of privately held corporations and publicly held 
corporations in the Paris Stock Market. Over the entire 
period leading up to 2001, 115 confrontational activist 
events were recorded, and since the 2001 reform, this 
number has already reached 88. Although the overall ave-
rage success rate of activism is 45%, a marked decrease 
can be observed in the second sub-period. Prior to 2001, 
the success rate stood at almost 50%, but between 2001 
and June 2008, it fell to only 39 %. 
II.2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND VARIABLE 
DEFINITION
Our research questions are: ﬁ rst, what characteristics, in 
terms of “pivotal” sponsor, degree of inﬂ uential activity 
and type of motive, are associated with successful outco-
mes? Second, is the involvement of one of the numerous 
investor associations which emerged in the wake of the 
1989 reform a signiﬁ cant factor of success? Third, has 
the 2001 New Economic Regulation Law, inasmuch as 
it has brought about a change in the characteristics of 
French shareholder activism, had a positive effect on 
successful outcomes? 
To address these research questions, our sample was 
divided into two sub-samples consisting respectively of 
a pre-2001 and a post-2001 sample. 
The hypotheses are tested by proceeding in two inter-
related steps. First, we provide descriptive statistics 
regarding French activism. Second, we conduct multi-
variate logit analyses of dependent variables to take into 
account simultaneous interactions between explanatory 
variables and highlight the marginal contribution to pre-
dicting activism success, and then a second multivariate 
analysis with control variables. Logit provides the same 
degree of reliability as probit estimation, but does not 
require normality of parameter distribution. 
Our empirical research design requires meaningful 
binary classiﬁ cations of activism success (SUCCESS), 
sponsor identity such as investor associations (ASSO) 
and institutional investors (INST), involvement of a proxy 
voting advisory ﬁ rm (PROXY), and categorical classiﬁ ca-
tions of degree of activism and motive. 
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We rank the degrees of activism (DEGREE) from the 
least to the most confrontational. Due to differences in 
sample selection, we include neither contact with the 
existing management (Becht et al., 2009) nor negotiation 
to obtain board representation without a proxy contest 
(Brav et al., 2008). These differences lead us to discard 
non-confrontational interactions between the activist 
coalition and its target ﬁ rm which could also inﬂ uence 
activism outcomes. In contrast with Klein and Zur (2009) 
and Brav et al. (2008), we consider that the highest 
degree of activism is constituted by the law suit rather 
than by takeover activity. Because of the concentration 
of ownership and the degree of inter-corporate hold-
ings, hostile takeovers are more difﬁ cult to undertake 
in France (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). Thus, the 
DEGREE variable is a categorical variable with the value 
of 0 in the case of the activist coalition carrying out for-
mal inﬂ uential activities, such as publicly criticizing the 
company, threatening a proxy solicitation campaign or 
sending written complaints to the AMF. The DEGREE 
variable has the value of 1 in the case of the activist 
coalition launching a proxy contest in order to put for-
ward shareholder proposals or to contest managerial 
proposals at general meetings. The value of 2 is used in 
the case of the coalition suing the company.
The motives (MOTIVE) giving rise to French activism 
can be classiﬁ ed into a number of major categories, each 
containing multiple sub-categories. Wahal (1996) identi-
ﬁ es three categories: “performance-related targeting”, 
“takeover-related targeting” and “governance-related 
targeting”. A motive is classiﬁ ed as “performance-related 
targeting” when the activist coalition accuses the control-
ling coalition of attempting to cover up ﬁ nancial difﬁ culties 
or fraudulently extracting private beneﬁ ts, or when the 
activist coalition puts pressure on the controlling coali-
tion to pursue strategic alternatives to maximize share-
holder value. The second motive is related to takeover, 
with activists either removing anti-takeover amendments 
or contesting a take-over bid, denouncing a concerted 
action forcing individual shareholders acting conjointly 
to make a bid, or opposing a merger or a squeeze-out. 
The third motive is related to governance issues, such 
as a change of board composition, a demand for greater 
information disclosure, an accusation of the potential 
use of fraudulent information, executive remuneration 
and other corporate governance issues. In contrast with 
Klein and Zur (2009) and Brav et al. (2008), we do not 
categorize these motives according to the relative level 
of aggressiveness of the initially stated objectives. This 
level depends on whether the controlling coalition has 
been able to negotiate an arrangement with the activist 
coalition if it is thought that this would limit the ﬁ nancial 
prejudice to either the ﬁ rm or itself. In fact, because our 
sample selection does not include cases involving a private 
degree of activism, all the motives taken into account in 
this study are considered as aggressive.  
It could be thought that the success of a confronta-
tional activist event is endogenous to the characteristics 
of the targeted corporation. Control variables have been 
found in previous research to be reliable determinants 
of shareholder activism outcomes (Gordon and Pound, 
1993; Smith, 1996; Strickland et al., 1996; Alexander et 
al., 2006; Klein and Zur, 2009). Each control variable is 
measured at the end of the year prior to the announce-
ment of a confrontational activist event. 
We include three governance variables: the proportion 
of institutional ownership (INST%), the concentration 
of ownership (C1) and the proportion of outside direc-
tors on the board (ADMEXT). The size of the holding 
is an important factor since large shareholders such as 
institutional investors may protect smaller shareholders. 
Nevertheless, in France, large shareholders have not 
been observed to sanction underperforming manage-
ment (Dherment-Ferere, Köke and Renneboog, 2006). 
From 1986-1995, Harbula (2007) pointed out that all 
of the largest 150 French ﬁ rms with a reference share-
holder holding ownership stakes superior to 50% were 
in fact underperforming. Empirical evidence suggests 
that beyond a certain level of ownership concentration, 
a greater possibility for the expropriation of minor-
ity shareholders outweighs the potential advantages 
of better monitoring. Thus, we include a measure of 
ownership concentration, C1, the most widely used in 
international literature (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998), 
which represents the stakes owned by the largest share-
holder in the ﬁ rm.
To measure the size (SIZE), we include the log of the total 
assets of the targeted ﬁ rm. Generally, victory against a larger 
ﬁ rm is harder to achieve due to the political relationships 
of the targeted ﬁ rm (Gordon and Pound, 1993). 
The targeted corporation’s financial performance 
(ROE) and leverage (LEVERAGE) may also inﬂ uence 
activism success. ROE is the quotient of return on equity 
and LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt on total assets. 
These variables are collected in the Diane data base for 
the pre-2001 period and the Thomson One Banker data 
base for the post-2001 period.  
We also control for past confrontational activist events 
(PAST) that by conveying information may inﬂ uence a 
passive coalition to become increasingly active, con-
sequently creating an escalation of confrontation. We 
use a binary variable to indicate whether the corpora-
tion has been targeted more than once over the whole 
period studied.
III. Results ■
First, we examine descriptive statistics regarding acti-
vism. Second, using logit models, we determine the 
characteristics of successful French shareholder activism 
before and after 2001.   
III.1. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics regarding activism. 
The most common activist sponsor remains the investor 
association. Whereas before 2001, they intervened in 
47% of confrontational activism events, after 2001 this 
proportion increased to 68% and the involvement of ins-
titutional investors was correspondingly reduced. Before 
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2001, the latter were sponsors in 36.5% of confrontatio-
nal activism events, but this percentage has declined to 
20.5% of cases since 2001. Surprisingly, a new category 
of activists such as hedge funds has emerged. Since 2001, 
these activist hedge funds have been sponsors in only 
ﬁ ve confrontational cases, but their success rate (83%) 
is extremely high. In contrast, we observe a decline of the 
success rate of investor association over the same period. 
This is supported by the ﬁ ndings of Brav et al. (2008) in 
the U.S. context. Using extensive data hand-collected 
from 2001 to 2006, they also calculate a high success rate 
(75%) achieved by 102 activist hedge funds in 781 non-
confrontational and confrontational cases. Brav and al. 
explain this phenomenon by the fact that activist hedge 
funds are better positioned to act as informed investors 
than other institutional investors because they employ 
highly incentivized managers who make use of the voting 
rights of a large unregulated pool of funds.
We observe that prior to 2001, 63% of inﬂ uential activi-
ties took the form of a law suit, the most confrontational 
degree of activism, but that subsequently this proportion 
has fallen to less than one-third. As explained by Girard 
(2001), this decline in judicial actions has been brought 
about by legal reforms to close loopholes. At the same 
time, the proportion of less confrontational activities is 
increasing. Since 2001, public interventions and proxy 
contests have each accounted for almost one-third of 
inﬂ uential activities. 
Prior to 2001, the most common motives were related 
to takeover and performance issues. Activist sharehol-
ders who targeted French companies were seeking an 
exit opportunity because they were dissatisﬁ ed with the 
ﬁ nancial performance of their invested companies and 
wished to exert pressure to negotiate a higher control 
premium during a takeover bid. Since this time, the most 
common grounds have been those related to corporate 
governance recommendations. Activist shareholders have 
elected independent board members, and criticized both 
executive remunerations and the presence of non-inde-
pendent board members. Over all the period studied the 
number of anti-takeover amendments constituting the 
motive has remained constant, a result which is consistent 
with those of Governance for Owners6. In its survey of 
French shareholder activism in 2008 AGMs, it found that 
the level of contested anti-takeover resolutions remained 
high. Surprisingly, in some targeted companies such as 
Veolia Environment and Essilor, the activist coalition did 
not contest the adoption of a new poison pill known as 
“Breton warrants” introduced in 2006. We also observe 
that while before 2001, the success rate of each motive 
was approximately 50%, after 2001, it fell to around 33% 
for performance-related motives and to 31% for takeover-
related motives. Only the success rate of governance-re-
lated motives has continued to show a positive evolution 
throughout the two periods studied. 
We also observe an increase in the activity of Proxy 
voting advisory ﬁ rms who intervened in 10% of activism 
campaigns before 2001, but have been involved in 28% 
of cases in the later period. 
III.2. LOGISTIC MODELS 
Table 5 reports the results of logit regressions of targeting 
outcomes where the dependent variable is equal to one if 
the outcome of targeting is successful and zero otherwise. 
Each of the four logit regressions in Table 5 estimates 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics regarding successful French activism  
Before 2001 After 2001
Number (%) Number of successes (%) Number (%) Number of successes (%)
Sponsor types 
Investor association
Institutional investor
– Hedge fund
54 (47%)
42 (36.5%)
0
25 (46%)
21 (50%)
0
60 (68%)
18 (20.5%)
6 (6.8%)
22 (37%)
11 (61%)
5 (83.3%)
Degrees of activism
Public intervention
Proxy contest
Law suit
16 (14%)
27 (23%)
72 (63%)
6 (38%)
9 (30%)
43 (60%)
34 (38%)
27 (30%)
28 (32%)
10 (24%)
12 (44%)
13 (46%)
Motives
Performance-related targeting
Takeover-related targeting
– Anti-takeover amendments
Governance-related targeting
– Information/potential fraud
– Board related
– Executive remuneration
– Other governance issues 
45 (39%)
47 (41%)
10
23 (20%)
7
0
7
9
23 (51%)
23 (49%)
3
11 (48%)
4
0 
7
0
15 (17%)
36 (41%)
9
37 (42%)
13
6
12
6
5 (33%)
11 (31%)
5
19 (51%)
6
3
9
1
Involvement of a proxy voting 
advisory ﬁ rm 11 (10%) 5 (45%) 25 (28%) 15 (60%)
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the effect of independent variables on the probability of 
activism success. For each regression, we include non-
correlated variables and results for the two sub-samples; 
the pre-2001 period and post-2001 period. 
The ﬁ rst model speciﬁ cation reported in Table 5 contains 
our basic speciﬁ cation linked to the characteristics of 
the French activism process. This model indicates that 
the probability of an activist coalition winning is posi-
tively and signiﬁ cantly related to the degree of activism 
(DEGREE) in both sub-periods. Before 2001, the most 
confrontational degree of activism is associated with 
an increase in the probability of an activism success by 
90.8 percentage points. After 2001, this percentage is 
equal to 73.5 and the probability of activism success is 
also positively and signiﬁ cantly related to the involve-
ment of a proxy voting advisory ﬁ rm (PROXY) and an 
institutional investor (INST). In the post-2001 sample 
which includes the 88 confrontational cases observed, 
the DEGREE continues to be positively and statistically 
signiﬁ cant. 
Table 5: Models predicting French activism outcomes 
This table reports the estimated marginal effects from logit regressions explaining French activism successes (1 = activist coalition achieves one or 
more motives, 0 = activist coalition does not achieve any motive) in terms of the activism process characteristics. The main independent variables 
are ASSO (equal to 1 if investor association is the sponsor, zero otherwise), INST (equal to 1 if institutional investor is the sponsor, zero otherwise), 
DEGREE (a categorical variable taking the value 0 if the inﬂ uential activity is a public intervention, value 1 if it is a proxy battle and value 2 if it is a law 
suit), MOTIV (a categorical variable taking the value 0 if the inﬂ uential activity is a public intervention, value 1 if it is a proxy battle and value 2 if it is 
a law suit) and PROXY (equal to 1 if a proxy voting advisory ﬁ rm is involved in the activism event, zero otherwise). All other independent variables are 
control variables. PAST is a dummy variable equal to 1 to indicate if the corporation has been targeted more than once, zero otherwise. SIZE is the log 
of total assets of the targeted corporation. %INST is the percentage of institutional ownership. C1 is the percentage of ownership held by the largest 
shareholder. ADMEXT is the proportion of outside directors on the board. ROE is the return on equity. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt on total assets. 
HEDGE is equal to one if hedge fund is the sponsor, zero otherwise.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Pre-2001period
Post-2001 
period
Pre-2001
period
Post-2001 
period
Pre-2001
period
Post-2001 
period
Post-2001 
period
ASSO
INST
DEGREE
MOTIV
PROXY
PAST
SIZE
%INST
C1
ADMEXT
ROE
LEVERAGE
HEDGE
Log-Likelihood 
ratio
Pseudo-R2
N° of 
observations
– 0.251
(0.484)
0.006
(0.988)
0.908*
(0.020)
– 0.021
(0.936)
0.069
(0.924)
153.113
0.071
115
1.281
(0.247)
2.748*
(0.033)
0.735†
(0.078)
0.466
(0.287)
5.578**
(0.008)
101.884
0.230
88
– 0.211
(0.57)
0.030
(0.942)
0.826*
(0.029)
0.069
(0.804)
0.041
(0.955)
– 0.588
(0.136)
150.753
0.097
115
1.066
(0.314)
2.610*
(0.039)
0.685†
(0.100)
0.316
(0.469)
5.403**
(0.009)
0.585
(0.373)
101.088
0.240
88
1.504
(0.207)
– 0.426
(0.403)
1.020†
(0.100)
– 0.001
(0.998)
– 0.789
(0.144)
0.127
(0.888)
– 0.409
(0.202)
– 0.001
(0.963)
– 0.012†
(0.306)
– 0.011
(0.439)
0.005
(0.339)
0.097†
(0.097)
69.727
0.223
60
2.241
(0.228)
4.408*
(0.039)
1.173†
(0.059)
0.377
(0.519)
12.378**
(0.008)
0.170
(0.814)
0.021
(0.952)
0.001
(0.976)
– 0.018
(0.130)
– 0.002
(0.895)
0.000
(0.997)
0.002
(0.883)
79.582
0.355
76
2.048
(0.289)
1.795*
(0.023)
0.569
(0.397)
15.516**
(0.008)
1.007
(0.359)
– 0.281
(0.398)
– 0.001
(0.963)
– 0.021†
(0.091)
– 0.007
(0.660)
0.000
(0.863)
– 0.006
(0.698)
58.181**
(0.007)
79.582
0.355
76
Note: *** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10
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The second model adds in a control for the fact that the 
targeted corporation has been the object of two or more 
confrontational activism events. Thus, it can be observed 
that whether the corporation has been targeted once or 
more than once over the two sub-periods studied is not 
an important determinant of the activism outcome. This 
result can be explained by corrective inﬂ uential activities 
exercised by the controlling coalition during and after 
the activism process. For example, in the case of French 
corporations targeted for performance between 1989 and 
2000, Girard (2004) shows that new sub-committees 
were constituted in anticipation of the activism process 
whereas immediately after the public announcement of 
confrontation, she observes an intensiﬁ cation of commu-
nication activities and an increase in executive turnover. 
In the case where management does not react to signs 
of impending shareholder confrontation, Ertimur, Ferri 
and Stubben (2010) show, even in the case of unsucces-
sful activism, targeted corporations are sanctioned by 
negative media coverage and by downgrades by gover-
nance rating ﬁ rms. Furthermore, their directors are less 
likely to be re-elected. As these corrective and coercive 
actions are also accompanied by ensuing modiﬁ cations 
in ownership structure, each case can be seen as being 
independent from the preceding cases. 
The third model includes controls for governance 
variables and ﬁ nancial indicators. In the pre-2001period, 
there are 115 confrontational activism events in total, but 
in only 60 cases do we have complete data on all control 
variables. In the post-2001 period, we have complete 
data on all control variables in 76 out of a total of 88 
cases. Once again, the degree of activism is positively and 
signiﬁ cantly related to activism success over the two sub-
periods. After 2001, the involvement of a proxy advisory 
ﬁ rm and the sponsorship of an institutional investor are 
also signiﬁ cant. Moreover, there is no reduction in the 
magnitude related to activism outcome; on the contrary, 
the marginal effects increase for all these determinants. 
Interestingly, in the post-2001 period, it does not appear 
that ﬁ rm size, ownership structure and ﬁ nancial variables 
account for confrontational activism outcomes. This 
ﬁ nding suggests that these variables mobilize passive 
shareholders by raising their expectations of making 
imminent private gains rather than by the probability of 
winning the confrontational case (Smith, 1996). However, 
in the pre-2001 period, the level of ownership concentra-
tion and leverage increased the probability of an activism 
success. This result suggests that these variables affect 
the expected beneﬁ ts from targeting because the activist 
coalition is seeking damages to compensate the ability of 
the controlling coalition to extract private beneﬁ ts. 
The fourth model replaces the dependent variable insti-
tutional sponsor (INST) by hedge fund (HEDGE) because 
as analyzed above, the latter are informed investors who 
are able to gather voting rights thanks to an unregulated 
pool of funds. Moreover, contrary to some types of institu-
tional investors, such as insurance companies and banks, 
they are not “pressure-sensitive” (Brickley, Lease and 
Smith, 1988), because they have no existing or potential 
business relationships with the targeted corporations. 
Such business relationships increase the risk of voting 
conﬂ icts and may also reduce the voting outcome. For 
the post-2001 period, the involvement of a hedge fund is 
positively and signiﬁ cantly related to targeting success. 
Curiously, the concentration ownership variable (C1) is 
associated with a decrease in the probability of an acti-
vism success by 2.1 percentage points. 
The results reveal that the highest degree of activism 
is signiﬁ cantly and positively related to a successful 
French activism outcome, over the two sub-periods. 
Therefore, hypothesis 2 was fully supported. According 
to Clément (2006), the organization of a proxy ﬁ ght in 
France usually takes place after shareholders have been 
notiﬁ ed of an AGM. Thus, inﬂ uential activities are not 
initiated “behind the scenes” but intervene directly at the 
third step of activism process which is characterized by 
public interventions. As previously underlined by Girard 
(2001), these interventions are used in combination with 
law suits to demand that a court-appointed representa-
tive convene an AGM7 and also to put a temporary halt 
to proceedings in order to gain time both to convince 
passive shareholders and to buy more shares. 
Contrary to Girard (2001), the investor association does 
not play a “pivotal” role (hypothesis 1 rejected). However, 
it is important to highlight that in her study covering con-
frontational cases before 2000, she identiﬁ es an independ-
ent composite variable composed of not only investor but 
also shareholder associations and law suits. But with the 
ongoing process of closing those legal loopholes which 
they traditionally used, investor associations have become 
increasingly specialized in law suits. Our results reveal 
that these investor associations are now often likely to be 
in competition with each other and generally pursue their 
own self-serving agendas thereby obscuring their mes-
sage to passive shareholders. For example, in the Arcelor 
confrontational case, in opposition to the ADAM, the 
APPACT made a series of highly controversial comments 
on the subject of the takeover of Arcelor by Mittal Steel, 
defending the majority coalition of Mittal Steel instead 
of the minority shareholders who held 6% of Arcelor in 
June 2007. In parallel, new conﬂ icts of interests have 
emerged due to the nomination of well known CEOs of 
investor associations to the board of previously targeted 
corporations. It can be said that some of these investor 
associations are also “pressure-sensitive” due to their 
new advisory roles within French corporations.
In fact, over the whole period studied, both before 
and after 2001, investor associations have not played a 
“pivotal” role. On the other hand, after 2001, we ﬁ nd a 
positive and signiﬁ cant link between French activism suc-
cess and new professionals such as proxy voting advisory 
ﬁ rms and institutional investors. Therefore, hypotheses 
3 and 4 were fully substantiated. These results are con-
sistent with those of Alexandre and Paquerot (2000) and 
Mtanios and Paquerot (1999). Before 2000, they conclude 
that institutional investors played a passive role because 
of the absence of a signiﬁ cant link between their hold-
ings and ﬁ nancial performance. In a more recent study, 
Ben M’Barek (2008) observes that, although French 
institutional investors are still generally passive, there 
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has been discernible change in their behavior. While 
some of the investors interviewed describe themselves 
as “money managers” with no ability to intervene in the 
management of invested corporations, others declare 
themselves to be active. Prior research has demonstrated 
that institutional investors are more or less active (Ryan 
and Schneider, 2002) depending on either the existence 
of legal constraints or internal/external management. 
For example, the decision to manage a fund’s portfolio 
internally or externally has implications on the fund’s 
activism degrees. Ryan and Schneider argue that external 
portfolio managers are likely to hold a large quantity of 
the same shares across the portfolios they manage, giving 
them a greater chance of success. Hedge funds are able to 
act similarly whilst internalizing the costs of activism by 
exploiting the voting rights of passive investors held in a 
pool of funds. This appears to be an explanatory variable 
of the activism outcome.    
In addition, the type of activism motive is not signiﬁ cant 
for three reasons (hypothesis 5 rejected). First, activism 
outcomes do not depend on the requirement that activ-
ist sponsors disclose the way they vote their shares in 
invested corporations (Cremers and Romano, 2007), 
but rather on the way they use confrontational tactics. 
Second, motives vary very considerably over time as a 
result of corporate activity takeover activity (Karpoff, 
Malatesta and Walking, 1996), trends in public opinion 
(Graves, Rehbein and Waddock, 2001) and new con-
cerns such as corporate governance issues imposed by 
Anglo-Saxon institutional investors (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004) investing in foreign ﬁ rms (Durney and 
Kim, 2005). Third, individual shareholders may lack the 
ﬁ nancial knowledge to evaluate the expected beneﬁ ts of 
a given activism motive. To illustrate this possibility, we 
note the following quote from the Financial Times in 1997 
made by a French individual Eurotunnel shareholder: “I 
didn’t know what shares were. I thought they were saved 
like loans (sic)” 8.
IV. Conclusion ■
This study contributes to agency theory literature by 
determining the characteristics of French successful share-
holder activism. It was observed that the development of 
shareholder activism is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
France. From the period January 1989 to June 2008, there 
were only 203 recorded cases of confrontational activism 
in French corporations and the average rate of success 
was 45%. By “successful activism” we mean that activist 
shareholders achieve at least one of their objectives. 
The empirical evidence conﬁ rms that over the whole 
period studied, the more confrontational the activism 
process, the greater the chance of the ﬁ rm acceding 
to the activist coalition’s demand. Moreover, we also 
observe that investor associations do not play a “pivotal” 
role because the legal environment tends to privilege 
the economic interest of the company at large rather 
than protect the rights of minority shareholders. This 
is consistent with the ongoing process of closing those 
legal loopholes which were traditionally used by investor 
associations as the basis of their claims. On the one hand, 
by accusing these judicial actions of being abusive, the 
French securities regulator has privileged stakeholder 
interest (“intérêt social”) at the expense of shareholder 
interest (“intérêt commun”). On the other hand, ﬁ nan-
cial resource requirements have forced ﬁ rms in France 
to adopt legal changes (Lee and Yoo, 2008) leading to 
increased shareholder democracy.  Importantly, the New 
Economic Regulation Law of 2001 has encouraged the 
professionalization of the French activism process due in 
large measure to the pivotal roles played by proxy voting 
advisory ﬁ rms, institutional investors and particularly 
hedge funds. Interestingly, this professionalization has 
created new conﬂ icts of interests9. 
These phenomena raise new questions. It may be inte-
resting to carry out further studies on the impact of new 
conﬂ icts of interests on French activism outcomes and 
to identify their effects on targeted corporations. To date 
there is no literature available describing the characteris-
tics of those French ﬁ rms which are targeted by hedge 
funds. Furthermore, this professionalization will surely 
have implications on the ongoing hedge fund regulation 
process and more generally on French legal enforcements 
particularly in the current context of regulation reform. 
However, our empirical study presents some limitations 
as to the sample selection and the various proxies and 
regression speciﬁ cations which may fail to identify the 
escalation of confrontation in a more professionalized and 
consequently segmented activism process. In particular, 
we do not take into account possible collusive strategies 
between the controlling coalition and the activist coalition 
neither did we examine possible emerging conﬂ icts of 
interests between competing investor associations. In 
subsequent research, it would seem necessary to make 
further distinctions within the classiﬁ cation of institu-
tional investors which would take into account not only 
the nature of their business relations but also whether 
they internalize or outsource their activism policy.  ■
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5 See AFG (French-based asset management association), Exercice des droits de vote 
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